CO129-580-2 Sino-Japanese War- British policy and reactions in Hong Kong and Malaya 27-7-1939 - 3-2-1940 — Page 87

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOvernment

FAR EASTERN (CHINA).

CONFIDENTIAL.

September 11, 1939.

SECTION 1.

[F 10074/87/10]

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo).

Copy No.

101

(No. 736.) Sir,

Foreign Office, September 11, 1939.

I began by THE Japanese Ambassador came to see me this afternoon. thanking his Excellency for the efforts that I knew he had made to support our request for the release of Colonel Spear. The Ambassador then said that he had been pleased to note the early statement of the new Japanese Government to the effect that Japan would adopt a policy of neutrality towards the present European conflict. This was a source of satisfaction to him, since he knew of the internal difficulties of his Government. He gave me the impression that the statement to which he referred had been inspired by those elements in the Government which were standing out against the influence of the military section and were in favour of closer relations with this country. Mr. Shigemitsu said that no Foreign Secretary had been appointed, and he did not envisage that his own name would be suggested, at any rate for some time ahead.

2. The Ambassador said that he welcomed this opportunity of having a conversation in general terms on the subject of what contribution could be made by our two countries towards a settlement of our outstanding problems. I said that I warmly shared his desire to see such an improvement of relations, and that Great Britain had no political aims in China. The Ambassador welcomed this statement, but said he hoped that His Majesty's Government would come to a proper realisation of the status of Japan on the continent of China. Japan's aim was to establish peace and order. The fighting of the last two years appeared to be drawing to its close, and now he anticipated that, within the next month or so, a new Government would be set up under Mr. Wang Ching-wei, who had been the civil head of the Kuomintang in the early days when Chiang Kai-shek was the military head. It must not be thought that Mr. Wang Ching-wei was The pro-Japanese; he was a Chinese patriot, but he was anti-Communist. Ambassador implied that this was the Government which we should gradually come to realise would be the future Government of China.

3. Continuing his account of the Japanese aims, the Ambassador said that he trusted that the British Concessions in China would not be used as centres of activity against Japan. He also said that any action, which we might take to encourage French or American influence in order to exert pressure on the Japanese, would create a deplorable impression, and would very probably achieve an object other than that we desired. Furthermore, we should not be likely to achieve results in any conversations with the Japanese unless they were carried on on a bilateral basis. The Japanese were not members of the League, were not sympathetic to League procedure, and did not like conversations with several nations at once. Any revision of the Nine-Power Treaty would be much better effected if, in the first place, direct conversations were held between His Majesty's Government and the Japanese Government.

4. I stated in reply to the Ambassador's comprehensive description of the Japanese attitude that His Majesty's Government could not be expected to go back on general policy. While we had every wish to have regard for realities, we could not put ourselves in a position where a charge could be levelled against us of reversing the whole of our Far Eastern policy and breaking with the Chungking Government. On the other hand, I could assure his Excellency, as, indeed, we had made plain in the Tokyo discussions, that we had no wish to allow the concessions to be used as centres of activity against the Japanese.

5. In conclusion, I assured the Ambassador that I would pay due attention to what he had said and would hope to have a further talk with him. The Ambassador replied that the best method of establishing more friendly relations in our two countries would be to consider the major issues of policy which at

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